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Combatting Piracy of Intellectual
Property in International Markets: A
Proposed Modification of the Special
301 Action
Theodore H. Davis, Jr.*
ABSTRACT

Increasing losses attributable to the piracy of United States intellectual
property rights in international trade have forced domestic policymakers
to reexamine how best to protect these rights. This Article examines the
United States most recent bilateral strategy to protect intellectual property, the Special 301 action, which creates a virtually mandatory United
States Trade Representative (USTR) investigation into states that have
inadequate intellectual property laws or that deny fair market access to
United States citizens who rely on intellectual property protection. Part
One of this Article discusses the historic interactionbetween United States
intellectualproperty protection and trade measures. Part Two examines
the Special 301 mechanism itself Part Three develops a framework for
evaluating the efficacy of the Special 301 mechanism as a bilateraltrade
weapon to secure the protection of United States intellectual property
rights abroad and argues that the USTR's applicationof Special 301 to
date represents an attempt to exercise a significant degree of administrative discretion unauthorized by Special 301's governing statutoryframework The Article concludes with a suggestion that Congress should
amend the Special 301 action to provide statutory authority for the
highly discretionaryapproach adopted by the USTR.
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INTRODUCTION

The increasing importance of intellectual property rights in world
markets has pushed the issue of their proper legal treatment to the forefront of domestic and international debate. Among northern industrialized states, a consensus exists that national policymakers should concern
themselves with the protection of intellectual property rights. Pursuant
to this view, incentives must be provided to encourage innovative activity
and maintain competitiveness in world markets. Moreover, returns on
innovation must be guaranteed to avoid the impairment of innovative
activity.' Accordingly, these nations have traditionally placed considerable importance on the protection of the intellectual property rights of

1. The Reagan Administration's statement on the subject provides a typical example
of the industrialized states' position with regard to the protection of intellectual property
rights in international trade:
Intellectual property protection is critically important to the United States, our
trading partners and the world economy.
Adequate and effective protection fosters creativity and know-how, encouraging
investment in research and development and in new facilities.
Innovation stimulates economic growth, increases employment and improves the
quality of life.
Technological progress is a critical aspect of U.S. competitiveness as well as
freer and fairer global trade.
In developing countries, improved intellectual property can foster domestic technologies and attract needed foreign know-how and investment.
U.S. Trade Representative, Administration Statement on the Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property Rights Abroad, 31 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 775, at
506, 506 (Apr. 10, 1986) [hereinafter Administration Statement].
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their citizenry.2
Not all participants in world trade, however, share this view. In contrast with their more industrialized counterparts, developing states frequently consider the intellectual property issue to revolve around fundamental economic policy questions, rather than the recognition of
fundamental rights comparable to those accorded to physical property.
For these states, the extensive rights granted by protective intellectual
property laws create undesirable monopolies on advanced technology
that facilitate the extraction of unreasonably high revenues and erect unjustified restrictions on desirable applications." Pursuant to this view,
weak protection of intellectual property rights makes knowledge available to all at minimum cost. 5 Furthermore, the resulting benefits that flow
to less developed states benefit all in the world community.6

2. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to establish patent
and copyright protection for authors and inventors).
3. R. Michael Gadbaw & Timothy J. Richards, Introduction, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 1, 2 (R. Michael
Gadbaw & Timothy J. Richards eds., 1988); cf. Robert P. Benko, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES 17 (1987) ("Early debate
[between northern nations] about whether there should be a property [right] in a technological idea has almost completely vanished-lawyers consider the question solved. The
question has recently reappeared, however, in the context of north-south debates and in
controversies surrounding new technologies.").
4. Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property, Technology and Economic Growth, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND ECONOMIC PER-

FORMANCE: INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 17, 27 (Francis W. Rushing & Carole
Ganz Brown eds., 1990). The Latin American Association of Pharmaceutical Industries
recently has articulated the perceived detrimental effects of strong patent laws:
Patents, with the monopoly they provide for imports, would eliminate the local
production of raw materials which has arisen in various countries of the region,
worsening the balance of trade by several billion dollars, and therefore, would
reserve the markets of the region for exports from the United States and other
developed nations at prices higher than international price levels.
Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 3, at 2 (quoting 5 INDUSTRIA FARMACEUTICA LATINO-AMERICANA, Patentes: la Rambonomio en Accion 29 (1986).
5. Mansfield, supra note 4, at 27. Although economic concerns generally are the
driving force behind the degree of protection afforded by developing nations to the intellectual property rights of foreign nationals, indigenous cultural factors occasionally play
a role as well. See Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 3, at 19 (noting that the traditional
Chinese cultural custom of copying an artist's or author's work as a means of complimenting the artist or author actually influenced the development of Korean and
Taiwanese intellectual property policy).
6. Mansfield, supra note 4, at 27.
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One consequence of these competing conceptual paradigms' has been
the emergence of piracy of intellectual property rights in international
trade. Increasing United States losses attributable to this phenomenon in
world markets8 force domestic policymakers to reexamine United States
treatment of intellectual property rights. This reconsideration has resuited in the enactment of bilateral trade measures, as well as multilateral efforts such as those that failed at the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to secure increased
protection. 9

7. This Article does not purport to address the issue of what level of protection intellectual property rights warrant, whether in individual states or in the arena of international trade. On that debate, see generally Carolos Alberto Primo Braga, The Economics
of Intellectual Property Rights and the GATT: A View From the South, 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 243 (1989); Mansfield, supra note 4. Rather, this Article accepts the
United States view of protection, arguendo, and seeks only to evaluate the efficacy of one
United States mechanism, the Special 301 action, as a tool for enforcing strong protection
of United States intellectual property rights abroad.
8. In 1986, the value of lost sales resulting from unauthorized copying of United
States patented, copyrighted, or trademarked materials amounted to an estimated $25
billion per year. Edwin A. Finn, Jr., That's the $60 Billion Question, FORBES, Nov. 17,
1986, at 40. By 1988, this figure exceeded $40 billion. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N,
FOREIGN PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EFFECT ON

U.S. INDUSTRY AND TRADE, app. H, at H-3 (1988).
I Nor is unauthorized copying the only source of loss to United States intellectual property owners. See, e.g., William M. Borchard, Trademark Piracy at Home and Abroad,
WALL ST. J., May 7, 1991, at A22, col. 3:
In the 1960s, for example, a swashbuckler named Robert Aries made a career of
registering U.S. trademarks-such as the right to use Pepsi-Cola as a trademark
for trucks-throughout Western Europe and then ransoming them back to their
original U.S. owners. (His mail-order book on avoiding trademark problems had a
$2,200 price tag.) Although he ultimately went to jail, it was not for this maneuver, which was perfectly legal.
Id.
Although the United States has succeeded recently in greatly reducing the level of
domestic infringement of intellectual property rights, see generally infra note 9, this success has been more than offset by these increases in foreign piracy. HELENA STALSON,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND U.S. COMPETITIVENESS IN TRADE 12 (1987).
9. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. (5) A3, 55
U.N.T.S. 187. The United States also has taken steps recently to provide increased protection of intellectual property rights against domestic infringers. See, e.g., Generic
Animal Drug and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 100-670, 102 Stat. 3971
(1988); Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935;
Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3383; Trademark
Clarification Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3335; Trademark Counterfeiting
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2178; Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585.
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This Article examines the United States most recent bilateral strategy
to protect intellectual property-the "Special 301 action." Enacted as
part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,0 the Special 301 mechanism provides for United States Trade Representative
(USTR) investigitions of states that deny adequate and effective protection of United States intellectual property rights or deny fair market access to United States citizens who rely on intellectual property protection. The enactment intends to provide the USTR with an effective,
bilateral, trade-based weapon for securing good faith negotiations or
other actions aimed at providing effective intellectual property
protection. 1
Part One of this Article discusses the historic interaction between
United States intellectual property protection and trade measures. It examines three areas of intellectual property law: copyright, trademark,
and the emerging sui generis field of semiconductor computer chip technology, where the United States has utilized trade-related measures to
attempt to protect United States intellectual property rights abroad.
Part Two of the Article examines the Special 301 mechanism itself. It
begins by describing the normal course of a Special 301 action, from the
USTR's identification of a "priority" state, through the decision of
whether to initiate an investigation, and ultimately, to the imposition of
sanctions, or, alternatively, to the termination of proceedings against the
state in question. Part Two also examines the actual uses to which the
Special 301 action has been put since its enactment.
Part Three develops a framework for evaluating the efficacy of the
Special 301 mechanism as a bilateral trade weapon to secure the protection of United States intellectual property rights abroad. It notes that the

10. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1181.
11. See Pub. L. 100-418, § 1303(a), 102 Stat. 1107, 1179 (1988):
(1) The Congress finds that(A) international protection of intellectual property rights is vital to the international competitiveness of United States persons that rely on protection of intellectual property rights; and
(B) the absence of adequate and effective protection of United States intellectual
property rights . . . seriously impede[s] the ability of ... United States [citizens]
that rely on protection of intellectual property rights to export and operate overseas, thereby harming the interest of the United States.
(2) The purpose of [Special 301] is to provide for the development of an overall
strategy to ensure adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights
and fair and equitable market access for United States persons that rely on protection of intellectual property rights.
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bilateral nature of the Special 301 remedy mandates that a use of the
action be narrowly tailored to the particular facts and circumstances of a
case. Additionally, Part Three argues that the USTR's application of
Special 301 represents an attempt to exercise a significant degree of administrative discretion that, although desirable from a policy standpoint,
is unauthorized by Special 301's governing statutory framework. Part
Three concludes that the USTR's success in securing increased foreign
protection of intellectual property rights suggests that Congress should
amend the Special 301 action to provide statutory authority for the
highly discretionary approach adopted by the USTR.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP OF UNITED STATES INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY DOCTRINE AND TRADE PROTECTION MECHANISMS
The federal government derives the authority to regulate intellectual
property from the Patent Clause12 and Commerce Clause"3 of the Con12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... [tio promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . .. "). At the
time of the Constitution's ratification, "arts" referred to the work of artisans, and therefore meant patent protection. Today, Congress has expanded patent protection to such
frontier areas as electronics, biotechnology, and products manufactured in outer space.
STALSON, supra note 8, at 13, 16. In contrast, the term "science" encompassed philosophy and authorship and therefore, meant copyright protection. Currently, such diverse
items as designs, engravings, etchings, photographs and negatives, mechanical recordings,
motion pictures, sound recordings, and computer software may receive copyright protection. Id. at 13, 17.
13. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the plenary power to "regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes"). The Supreme Court held the first statutory attempts of the United States federal government at regulation of trademarks, the Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 77, 16
Stat. 198, 210, and the Act of August 14, 1876, ch. 274, 19 Stat. 141, to be an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' patent and copyright power. United States v. Steffens (The
Trade-Mark Cases), 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) ("The ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to invention or discovery [and] requires no fancy or imagination, no genius,
[and] no laborious thought."). The Court indicated, however, that such legislation might
be permissible if based on the commerce power instead. Id. at 95-96.
Reenacting the legislation under the auspices of the commerce clause, Congress initially adhered so literally to its text that it granted the Commissioner of Patents the
authority to register only trademarks used in commerce with foreign nations or with
Indian tribes. Act of March 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502. By 1890, however, Congress
had taken steps to expand the scope of the law to international trade. Tariff Act of 1890,
ch. 1244, § 7, 26 Stat. 567, 613. The 1890 Act laid the foundation for the first modern
trademark legislation in 1905, see Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 27, 33 Stat. 724, 730,
which in turn became the core of current statutes. See generally infra notes 27-36 and
accompanying text. Modem trademark legislation is based upon the 1946 Lanham Act,
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stitution. Throughout the years, the driving force behind legislation enacted under these auspices has been the retention of economic benefits for
investors of the temporal and financial resources necessary to secure the
benefits of innovation. The United States Supreme Court has stated:
The economic philosophy behind the [Patent Clause] is the conviction
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in
"Science and Useful Arts." Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered."
Because the United States traditionally has been concerned more with
domestic rather than with foreign infringement, 5 the relationship between trade and regulatory mechanisms and intellectual property rights
has long been uncertain at best.' 6 Notwithstanding the historical absence
of a comprehensive approach incorporating international trade regulation
and intellectual property rights, however, federal legislation at times has
reflected an awareness that the two properly should be integrated into a
common set of strategies."7 Accordingly, the enactment of measures such
as the Special 301 action must be viewed in proper historical perspective.
The following sections examine previous congressional efforts, all of
which may be superseded by the operation of Special 301, to implement
intellectual property goals through trade laws in the areas of copyright,
trademark, and the emerging field of semiconductor mask technology."

60 Stat. 427.
14. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); cf The FEDERALIST No. 43, at 279
(James Madison) ("The utility of this [authorization for intellectual property legislation]
will scarcely be questioned .... The public good fully coincides ... with the claims of
individuals.").

15. Arthur Buck, Copyright, Harmonization and Revision: 'InternationalConventions on Copyright Law,' 9 INT'L Bus. LAW. 475, 475 (1981). For a list of recent laws
aimed at reducing domestic infringement of intellectual property rights, see supra note 9.

16. See, e.g., R. Michael Gadbaw, Intellectual Property and International Trade:
Merger or Marriageof Convenience?, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 223, 226-27 (1989):
Until relatively recently, intellectual property and international trade policies
were relegated to distinct and separate spheres. Each was based upon its own set
of domestic laws and international agreements, although common principles such
as national treatment were central features of the international agreements in both
-domains. Entirely distinct bureaucracies administered these laws and agreements
both at the national and international levels, and their efforts were rarely viewed
as requiring coordination, except perhaps in light of foreign political-as distinct
from economic-policy considerations.

Id.
17.
18.

Id. at 226.
This Article attempts to examine only those United States laws that on their face
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Copyright

1. The Chace Act
The trend toward protection of the intellectual property rights of
United States citizens appeared even before the ratification of the Constitution. Prior to 1787, all states except Connecticut enacted laws protecting copyright holders. Most of these laws, however, extended protection
only to United States authors.1"
The first federal enactment under the Patent Clause, the Copyright
Act of 1790, retained this protectionist overtone. Although this legislation
provided copyright protection for maps, charts, and books, it only protected the works of United States authors.2" Congress retained the citizenry requirement for more than a century. In 1891, Congress finally
adopted an early bilateral approach through section 13 of the Chace Act
of 1891, which established two courses of action for a foreign national
seeking to gain United States copyright protection. 21 First, foreign citizens of states providing copyright protection to United States citizens enjoyed reciprocal privileges. Second, the United States government pro-

integrate intellectual property protection and trade strategies into a single policy. As a
result, the Article does not address statutes creating a private right of action for intellectual property owners, such as section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337 (1988)) (proscribing "unfair methods of competition and... importation of articles"), that, although not making specific reference to intellectual property piracy, have
been employed in the past by United States intellectual property owners in cases in
which there exists a domestic industry relating to the intellectual property rights in question and where the infringing goods have been imported into the United States. See gen-

erally Paul Victor, PreventingImportation of Products in Violation of Property Rights,
53 ANTITRUST L.J. 783, 783 (1984) (examining use of section 337 by patent owners). It
is worth noting, however, that the enactment of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, which liberalizes significantly the
availability of section 337 actions for intellectual property owners, is likely to lead to
increased use of this mechanism in the future.
Given the close procedural relationship between the Special 301 action and its immediate conceptual predecessor, the section 301 action, codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §
2411-16 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), this Article also does not attempt to undertake a separate examination of the treatment of intellectual property rights in ordinary section 301
investigations prior to 1989.
19. STALSON, supra note 8, at 13.
20. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, §§ 1, 5, 1 Stat. 124, 124-25 (denying protection to
works "written, printed, or published by any person not a citizen of the United States").
21. Chace Act of 1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106.
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tected works by foreign authors from states that adhered to international
agreements with the United States providing for reciprocity.22 In either
case, the President decided the issue of whether sufficient reciprocity existed, but eventually the President established bilateral relations with
thirty-five states.2"

2.

The Caribbean Basin Initiative

The 1983 Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act 4 discourages the
governments of recipient nations from "poaching" and rebroadcasting
copyrighted satellite television transmissions by conditioning receipt of
benefits on an executive branch finding of an absence of such activity.2 5
The Act also authorizes the President to review the extent to which a
recipient state's laws provide adequate means for foreign nationals "to
secure, exercise, and enforce exclusive rights in intellectual property." 6
Therefore, as amended, the Caribbean Basin Initiative represents another trade-based weapon directed towards protecting United States

22. Id. § 13, 26 Stat. at 1110.
23. Oversight on InternationalCopyrights: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 30 (1984) (Report of the U.S. Copyright Office) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
Despite this apparent liberalization, Congress retained two effective barriers to foreign
authors. First, the Chace Act mandated compliance by all authors with the procedural
requirements of the United States Copyright Office. Chace Act of 1891, § 3, 26 Stat. at
1107. The practical effect of this stipulation was that the intricacies of United States law
and the significant distances that foreign authors had to travel to Washington substantially disadvantaged them vis-a-vis United States citizens. Senate Hearings,supra, at 30.
Second, the Chace Act maintained a requirement that authors deposit two copies, both
of which were manufactured in the United States, of each work in the Library of Congress. Chace Act of 1891, § 3, 26 Stat. at 1107. Moreover, the Chace Act took the
additional step of prohibiting the importation of foreign works not manufactured in the
United States. Id. § 3, 26 Stat. at 1107-08. This so-called "manufacturing clause" had
the practical effect of denying copyright protection to most English language works of
United States authors printed abroad. STALSON, supra note 8, at 17. Although Congress
slightly weakened the manufacturing clause following its enactment, see, e.g., The Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 8, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (allowing foreign authors to copyright work in the absence of a presidential finding of reciprocity, providing that the author's residence was within the United States at the time of the first publication of the
work in question), it remained substantially in place until June 1986, when authority for
it finally lapsed. This removed a major impediment to United States entry into the Berne
Convention. STALSON, supra note 8, at 17.
24. Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 369.
25. See 19 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(9) (1988); see also 19 C.F.R. § 10.191-.198 (1989).
26. 19 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(9) (1988).

514
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rights abroad.
B.

Trademark

The principle of utilizing trade mechanisms to protect trademark
owners from counterfeiting marks emerged early in the development of
United States policy towards trademarks.27 Nine years after the enactment of the first successful trademark legislation, 8 the Fifty-First Congress enacted legislation barring the importation of articles that copy or
simulate the name or registered trademark of domestic manufacturers. 9
Subsequently, Congress reenacted language from this legislation in
18970 and 1905.31

27. Under current law, section 42 of the Lanham Act protects mark holders against
foreign counterfeiting. It provides that "no article of imported merchandise which shall
copy or simulate the name of the [sic] any domestic manufacture, or manufacturer, or
trader . . . shall be admitted to entry at any customhouse of the United States." 15
U.S.C. § 1124 (1988). Title II, sections 211(a), (c) of the Customs Procedural Reform
and Simplification Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-410, 92 Stat. 888, 903 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1526(e) (1988)), grants additional protection for trademark holders against counterfeit
imports:
Any ... merchandise bearing a counterfeit mark (within the meaning of section
1127 of title 15) imported into the United States in violation of the provisions of
section 1124 of title 15, shall be seized and, in the absence of the written consent
of the trademark owner, forfeited for violations of the customs laws.
In turn, the Lanham Act defines a counterfeit as "a spurious mark which is identical
with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a registered mark." 15 U.S.C. § 1127
(1988). If a seizure occurs, the Secretary of the Treasury is instructed to obliterate the
trademark and dispose of the goods by distributing them to federal, state, and local agencies and eleemosynary institutions that have a need for the merchandise. 19 U.S.C. §
1526(e) (1988).

28. See generally supra note 13.
29. Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244, § 7, 26 Stat. 567, 613. The relevant text reads
"[that on and after March first, eighteen hundred and ninety-one, no article of imported
merchandise which shall copy or simulate the name or trade-mark of any domestic manufacture or manufacturer, shall be admitted to entry at any custom-house of the United
States."
30. Tariff Act of 1897, ch. 11, § 11, 30 Stat. 151, 207.
31. The relevant text of the 1905 Act further added a bilateral element in the
provision:
That no article of imported merchandise which shall copy or simulate the name of
any domestic manufacture, or manufacturer or trader, or of any manufacturer or
trader located in any foreign country which, by treaty, convention, or law affords
similar privileges to citizens of the United States, or which shall copy or simulate a
trade-mark registered in accordance with the provisions of this Act, or shall bear a
name or mark calculated to induce the public to believe that the article is manufactured in the United States, or that it is manufactured in any foreign country or
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In 1922, the Sixty-Seventh Congress augmented the availability of
trade remedies for mark owners. In response to a decision from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit interpreting the
language of the 1905 Act, 2 Congress added section 526 as an amendment to the Tariff Act of 1922.13 This section established a unilateral
trade mechanism"' that proscribed the importation of any foreign manufacture's merchandise that bears a registered trademark without the
written consent of the owner.3 5 It remains in force today.3"

C. Semiconductor Mask Technology
The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 (SCPA)37 reaffirmed
congressional commitment to the use of trade mechanisms as weapons
against piracy in international markets. SCPA established a bilateral
reciprocity statute aimed at increasing protection for the United States
semiconductor industry. Pursuant to its terms, foreign manufacturers can

locality other than the country or locality in which it is in fact manufactured, shall
be admitted to entry at any custom-house of the United States.
Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 27, 33 Stat. 724, 730.
32. A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689
(1923).
33. Pub. L. No. 67-318, 42 Stat. 975 (1922).
34. In light of the congressional confusion surrounding passage of section 526, see
supra note 31, the Federal Circuit has concluded that the statute should be regarded
exclusively as a trade remedy rather than as an intellectual property remedy. See Vivitar
Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (five judge panel), cert.

denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986).
35. For the amendment's current formulation, see 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1988).
36. Historically, section 526 has been the focus of trademark holders' efforts to battle
the operation of the gray market, in which authentic trademarked products are imported
into the United States outside the goods' normal chains of distribution. See generally
Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Comment, Applying Grecian Formula to InternationalTrade:
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. and the Legality of Gray Market Imports, 75 VA. L. REV.
1397 (1989).
Unlike trademark holders, copyright owners affected by gray market imports have
been able to avail themselves of recent federal legislation to restrict importation of the
goods in question. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Scorpio Music Distrib., 569
F. Supp. 47 (E.D. Pa. 1983), affd without op., 738 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1984) (employing
17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1988) to prevent importation of gray market copyrighted articles).
Similarly, section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988)),
generally protects patent owners from gray market imports. Victor, supra note 18, at
783.
37. Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14 (1988)).
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enjoy United States protection of their products only if their home state
provides comparable protection to United States citizens.
The SCPA establishes two avenues for foreign nationals seeking to
secure protection. First, section 902(a)(2) 38 authorizes the issuance of a
Presidential Proclamation, which provides for permanent protection of
foreign semiconductor technology if the President finds that the foreign
state in question offers substantially the same protection for United
States technology as it does for domestic technology or provides the same
protection afforded by United States law.3 9 Foreign nationals can secure
protection under this section if their state signs a treaty protecting semiconductor works to which the United States is a party.4"
Second, section 914 of the SCPA4 1 establishes an interim procedure
whereby foreign nationals can secure protection if three conditions are
met: (1) their native state is making good faith efforts and reasonable
progress towards legislation or treaties aimed at protecting United States
products; (2) citizens of the foreign state are not engaged in piracy of
United States products; and (3) the purposes of the SCPA would be furthered.42 These requirements effectively give section 914 a much stronger
procedural and substantive reciprocity orientation than its section 902
counterpart.4 3

III.

THE SPECIAL

301

ACTION: PROCEDURES AND APPLICATIONS

A. Procedures
The typical procedural course taken by a Special 301 action has two
phases. This section examines both in detail.
1. The Special 301 Priority Determination
Invocations of the Special 301 action originate in the annual National
Trade Estimate Report (NTE Report) mandated by section 2241 of the
Trade Act."" This section requires the USTR to submit a report each
year to the President and appropriate congressional committees by
38. Codified at 17 U.S.C. § 902(a)(2) (1988).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Codified at 17 U.S.C. § 914 (1988).

42. Id. § 914(a) (1-3).
43. Gadbaw, supra note 16, at 237.
44. 19 U.S.C. § 2241 (1988).
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March 31 5 detailing practices of foreign states that, among other things,
erect "significant barriers to, or distortions of" United States exports of
products protected by trademarks, patents, or copyrights.4 6 Within thirty
days of the submission of the NTE Report, the USTR must designate
those states eligible for Special 301 treatment. States run the risk of this
identification if their policies or practices fall into one of two categories.
First, the USTR must designate for possible Special 301 action those
foreign states that deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual
property rights. 47 For the purposes of Special 301:
A foreign country denies adequate and effective protection of intellectual
property if the foreign country denies adequate and effective means under
the laws of the foreign country for persons who are not citizens or nationals of such foreign country to secure, exercise, and enforce rights relating
to patents, process patents, registered trademarks, copyrights, and mask
48
works.

45. Id. § 2241(b)(1). For 1989, the NTE Report due date was April 30. Id.
46. Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 2241, the NTE Report shall:
(A) identify and analyze acts, policies, or practices of each foreign country which
constitute significant barriers to, or distortions of(i) United States exports of goods or services (including... property protected by
trademarks, patents, and copyrights exported or licensed by United States persons), and
(B) make an estimate of the trade-distorting impact on United States commerce
of any act, policy, or practice identified under subparagraph (A); and
(C) make an estimate, if feasible, of(i) the value of additional goods and services of the United States ...
that would have been exported to ... each foreign country during [the previous]
calendar year if each of such acts, policies, and practices ... did not exist.
47. 19 U.S.C. § 2242(a)(1)(A) (1988).
48. Id. § 2242(d)(2); cf. H.R. REP. No. 1090, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5101. This report defined "adequate and effective" for
purposes of linking intellectual property protection to the receipt of benefits under the
Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984. It stated:
In order to determine whether a country is providing "adequate and effective [protection]" [of] intellectual property, the President should consider, among other factors, the extent of statutory protection for intellectual property (including the scope
and duration of such protection), the remedies available to aggrieved parties, the
willingness and ability of the government to enforce intellectual property rights on
behalf of foreign nationals, the ability of foreign nationals effectively to enforce
their intellectual property rights on their own behalf, and whether the country's
system of law imposes formalities or similar requirements that, in practice, are an
obstacle [to] the meaningful protection for foreign nationals not imposed on domestic concerns.
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Alternatively, a state may receive Special 301 treatment if its laws deny fair
and equitable market access to United States nationals that rely on intellectual
property protection.4 ' To ascertain whether this situation exists with respect to
a particular state, the USTR must determine if the state under scrutiny denies
access to markets for products protected by copyrights, patents, or process patents through laws, procedures, practices, or regulations that: (1) violate provisions of international law or agreements to which both the United States and the
5
foreign state are parties; 50 or (2) constitute discriminatory nontariff barriers. 2
Identification under this prong is possible only if the USTR determines that52 a
factual basis exists for finding a denial of fair and equitable market access.
After identifying states eligible for Special 301 treatment, the USTR then
designates priority states. 53 Only those states that have "the most onerous or
egregious acts, policies, or practices" will be considered priority states." These
acts, policies, or practices must have the "greatest adverse impact (actual or
potential) on the relevant United States products. '55 A designated state, however, will be exempt from Special 301 treatment if the USTR finds that the
state either enters into good faith negotiations or, alternatively, makes "significant progress" in bilateral or multilateral negotiations to provide increased pro56
tection for intellectual property rights.

H.R. REP. No. 1090, at 12-13, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5112-13.
49. 19 U.S.C. § 2242(a)(1)(B). For the purposes of Special 301:
The term "persons that rely upon intellectual property protection" means persons
involved in(A) the creation, production or licensing of works of authorship (within the meaning of sections 102 and 103 of Title 17) that are copyrighted, or
(B) the manufacture of products that are patented or for which there are process
patents.
Id. § 2242(d)(1).
50. Id. § 2242(d)(3)(A).
51. Id. § 2242(d)(3)(B).
52. Id. § 2242(b)(3).
53. Id. § 2242(a)(2). Although the USTR ultimately determines whether a given
state should be considered a priority state for the purposes of a Special 301 action, section 2242(b)(2) mandates consultation with the Register of Copyrights, the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, and "other appropriate officers of the Federal Government," as well as consideration of information contained in the NTE Report and in
petitions submitted by interested parties. 19 U.S.C. § 2242(b)(2).
54. Id. § 2242(b)(1)(A).
55. Id. § 2242(b)(1)(B).
56. Id. § 2242(b)(1)(C).
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The Section 301 Investigation Under Special 301

Once the USTR designates a foreign state as a priority state, section
2412(b)(2)(A) 57 requires the USTR to initiate an unfair trade practices
investigation pursuant to the procedures contained in section 301 of the
Trade Act of i97458 within thirty days, but only if no progress can be
made through consultations with the foreign government. 59 Two possible
qualifications affect this mandatory language: first, the USTR is not required to begin an investigation if the investigation would be detrimental
to United States economic interests;6" and second, the USTR has discretion to determine whether an investigation would be effective in addressing the questionable foreign practice.61
Unlike the more typical section 301 investigation,62 which has a
twelve to eighteen month timetable, 3 a section 301 investigation stem-

57. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(2)(A) (1988).
58. For the procedural framework for section 301 actions, see 19 U.S.C. § 2411-16
(1988).
59. Prior to the mandatory self-initiation of a section 301 investigation of priority
states under Special 301, the USTR was, and remains, authorized to initiate investigations in response to petitions from interested parties or on a discretionary self-initiated
motion. See 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)-(b). On the use of this type of section 301 investigation
since the enactment of the Special 301 action, see infra notes 95-97 and accompanying
text.
The Special 301 action is not the first congressional attempt to employ the section 301
mechanism against United States trading partners whose weak intellectual property laws
lend themselves to piracy. Section 503(c)(5) of the Trade Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98573, 98 Stat. 2948 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2462(c)(5) (1988)), which required the President to take into account the protection afforded to United States intellectual property
rights by a foreign nation when determining that nation's eligibility for the Generalized
System of Preferences Program (GSP Program), also identified this protection as a factor
in whether the nation's trade practices should be considered "unjustifiable" or "unreasonable" for purposes of a section 301 action. At the time of Special 301's passage, four
of the top five beneficiary states under the GSP Program had entered into agreements
with the United States, all pledging to improve protection of intellectual property rights
to some degree. Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 3, at 23 n.22.
60. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(2)(B). If the USTR declines to initiate an investigation
pursuant to this provision, the USTR must submit to Congress a written report setting
forth both the reasons for the determination and the United States economic interests that
would be affected adversely. Id. § 2412(b)(2)(C).
61. Id. § 2412(c).
62. Because section 301 investigations themselves are governed by section 302 of the
Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988), often they are referred to as Section 302
investigations. This Article adopts the former nomenclature.
63. 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(2).
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ming from a Special 301 priority designation is conducted under a six
month "fast-track" system." Upon the conclusion of the investigation,
the USTR then determines whether to subject that state to a broad range5
of specified trade-based retaliatory mechanisms within six months.1
Foreign actions targeted by the section 301 investigation generally fall
into two categories.
First, policies or practices of foreign governments under investigation
are within the ambit of section 301 if they violate the provisions of a
trade agreement or deny benefits to the United States under a trade
agreement.6 8 Generally, the USTR has interpreted the term "trade
agreement" narrowly to include only the GATT and trade agreements
approved under section 3(a) of the Trade Agreement Act of 1979."'
Therefore, it is unlikely that this prong will lead to retaliatory sanctions
against a Special 301 priority state.68
Under the second set of requirements for imposing retaliatory trade
sanctions, a foreign state's action comes within the ambit of an actionable
violation if it is "unjustifiable and burdens or restricts United States
commerce."6 9 Alternatively, any foreign action unreasonable or discriminatory, as well as burdensome on United States commerce, is subject to
retaliation. 70 For the purposes of section 301 investigations, a foreign
practice will be deemed unreasonable if it denies adequate and effective

64. Id. § 2414(a)(3)(A).
65. 19 U.S.C. § 2411-16 (1988).
66. Id. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(i) (1988).
67. 19 U.S.C. § 2503(a) (1988). The general lack of provisions in these agreements
for the protection of intellectual property greatly diminishes their usefulness in this context. Trade agreements recognized by the USTR's office for the purposes of Section 301
actions include the following: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. (5) A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187; Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10,402; Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 12, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10,403; Agreement on
Import Licensing Procedures, Apr. 12, 1979, 32 U.S.T. 1585; Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 405; Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513; Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4919; Agreement on
Trade in Civil Aircraft, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 619. As currently constituted, the
GATT does not attempt to provide trade-based protection of intellectual property rights.
68. At the time of Special 301's enactment, most section 301 actions involved trade
agreements under this prong. Judith Bello & Alan Holmer, Significant Recent Developments in Section 301 Unfair Trade Cases, 21 INT'L LAW. 211, 213 n.13 (1987).
69. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii).
70. Id. § 2411(b)(1).
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protection of intellectual property rights." Similarly, unjustifiable foreign practices under section 301 include those acts or policies that deny
the "right of establishment or protection of intellectual property
rights."7 2 Discriminatory foreign action includes the implementation of
7 3
discriminatory tariff barriers, which fulfill the third requirement.
As a practical matter, an investigation of a Special 301 priority state is
likely to result in a finding that the state's practices satisfy one, if not all
three, of the requirements for an imposition of sanctions. At the threshold, if the USTR determines during the initial Special 301 proceedings
that the foreign action in question constitutes an "onerous or egregious"
act with the "greatest adverse impact . . . on the relevant United States
products,"7 4 the practice probably will qualify as a "burden" on United
States commerce. This conclusion is consistent with previous United
States findings in section 301 investigations prior to 1988 that a foreign
state's inadequate protection of intellectual property rights satisfies the
75
requirement.

71. Id. § 2411(d)(3)(B)(i)(II).
72. Id. § 2411(d)(4)(B).
73. 19 U.S.C. § 2242(d)(3)(B). Pursuant to this section, however, a foreign state's
practices may qualify as denying fair and equitable market access to United States nationals through the violation of provisions of international law or international agreements to which both the United States and the foreign state are parties. Id. §
2242(d)(3)(A). The general moribundity of these agreements in the area of intellectual
property renders it more likely that a foreign state falling into this category has done so
through discriminatory tariff barriers.
74. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Adequacy of Korean Laws for the Protection of Intellectual Property
Rights, 50 Fed. Reg. 45,833 (Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 1985). This action
provides an example of the potential effectiveness and inherent limitations of section 301
investigations in securing increased foreign protection of intellectual property rights. In
1985, President Reagan initiated a section 301 investigation in response to South Korea's
inadequate protection of United States intellectual property rights. Although the investigation ultimately resulted in an agreement by the Korean government to enact new and
improved copyright, patent, and trademark laws, the initial Korean reaction to the investigation was to extend protection to technology originating in the United States, but to
deny it to that generated in other states. This resulted in significant distortions of trade.
Ashoka Mody, New InternationalEnvironment for Intellectual Property Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS,

supra note 4, at 203, 224-25. For details

of the new Korean laws, see generally Judith Bello & Alan Holmer, Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974: Requirements, Procedures, and Developments, 7 Nw. J.

& Bus. 633, 662-64 (1986).
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Once the USTR initiates a section 301 investigation stemming from
Special 301 proceedings, the USTR has six months to determine what
action, if any, to take in response to the practices of the foreign state in
question. If the USTR finds that the practices fulfill the criteria outlined
above, the range of discretionary trade-based weapons is broad. Pursuant
to section 2411 (c)(1), a USTR, within thirty days of determining that an
actionable violation exists 76 and subject to the direction of the President,
7
may:
(A) suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of, benefits of trade
concessions . . .; (B) impose duties or other import restrictions on the
goods of, and, notwithstanding any other provision of law, fees or restrictions on the services of, such foreign country...; or (0) enter into binding
agreements with such foreign country that commit ... [it to] (i) eliminate,
or phase out the [unfair] act, policy, or practice . . ., (ii) eliminate any
burden or restriction on United States commerce resulting from such act,
policy, or practice, or (iii) provide the 78United States with compensatory
trade benefits that ...are satisfactory.
Under these criteria, any goods from the foreign state in question may be
subject to a retaliatory action, regardless of whether those goods were
involved in the practice leading to the imposition of sanctions.7 9
The USTR is not required to take action under a number of circumstances. For example, the priority state's agreement to eliminate the
practice in question or to eliminate the burden or restriction on United
States commerce will protect it from actual retaliation. 0 Also, if eliminating the offending practice is impossible for the foreign state, the
USTR may accept alternative compensatory trade benefits.8 ' Moreover,
the statute precludes sanctions if retaliatory action would have an adverse effect on the United States economy substantially out of proportion
to the benefits of the action.8 2 Finally, the need to avoid serious harm to
United States national security constrains any action taken. 8
76. 19 U.S.C. § 2415(a) (1988).
77. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1).
78. Id. § 2411(c)(1).
79. Id. § 2411(c)(3)(B).
80. Id. § 2411(a)(2)(B)(ii).
81. Id. § 2411(a)(2)(B)(iii).
82. Id. § 2411(a)(2)(B)(iv).
83. Id. § 2411(a)(2)(B)(v). The USTR may delay implementation of retaliatory action when: (i) the majority of the representatives of the domestic industry that would
benefit from the action request a delay; (ii) the USTR determines that substantial pro-
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B. Applications to Date
Because a state's priority status under a Special 301 determination
largely hinges upon the USTR's finding that the state's laws provide an
egregiously low level of protection for United States intellectual property
rights and have a substantial adverse impact on United States trade, a
Special 301 priority state's practices doubtfully will ever fail to satisfy
the standards necessary for the imposition of retaliatory sanctions. Consequently, the literal text of the Special 301 mechanism suggests that its
implementation would have resulted in a substantial increase in sanctions against states lacking minimal levels of intellectual property
protection.
No such increase, however, has occurred. Perhaps more surprisingly,
the USTR declined to designate a single state for Special 301 priority
treatment during the year following its enactment. Consequently, the
swift imposition of retaliatory trade sanctions envisioned by Congress initially remained more of a threat than an actual weapon.
In large part, this result stems from the USTR's interpretation of the
Special 301 mechanism. In her first invocation of the Special 301 provision on April 25, 1989, USTR Carla Hills did not target any priority
states for investigation and possible retaliation.8 4 Rather, she announced
that twenty-five states would be placed on a two-tiered "watch list,"
which required them to make progress on intellectual property reform to
avoid future priority designation and sanctions.8 5 The first tier of the
watch list, the priority category, contained states required to demonstrate
'progress in enumerated areas within 150 days of the announcement. 8
The second tier of the list contained states asked to step up efforts to
improve intellectual property reform. 7 Pursuant to the announcement,
the listed states faced becoming the subject of an actual -investigation

gress is being made; or (iii) where a delay is necessary to obtain a satisfactory solution to
the situation. 19 U.S.C. § 2415(a)(2).
84. USTR Defends Administration'sNaming ofJapan, India, Brazil Under Super
301, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 684, 684 (May 31, 1989).
85. The 25 states were Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt,
Greece, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines,
Portugal, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Spain, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela,
and Yugoslavia. Id.
86. These states included Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Korea,
Taiwan, and Thailand. Id. The date for a demonstration of progress was set on November 1, 1989.
87. These states included Argentina, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Greece, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. Id.
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should they abandon good faith negotiations or fail to make significant
progress in bilateral or multilateral negotiations in the intellectual property area. 88
USTR Hills reaffirmed this two-tiered approach in her first sixmonth reexamination of the Special 301 mechanism. 0 On November 1,
1989, she again declined to designate priority states for the purpose of
section 301 investigations. Once again, Hills placed the states with the
most egregiously deficient protection of intellectual property only on a
priority watch list.90 Moreover, this pattern continued through the April
27, 1990 reexamination, when USTR Hills again declined to target any
of the states on the priority watch list for investigation, despite concluding that the protection afforded to intellectual property owners in some
nations was "'below international standards and a cause for concern.' "" Therefore, the USTR's interpretation of Special 301 provides
an administrative escape clause.
Use of the watch list system did not result in a lack of progress in
negotiations with the states named on the watch list. By the end of the
six-month period following the first Special 301 announcement, three of
the eight states originally on the priority watch list, Taiwan, Korea, and
Saudi Arabia, had made sufficient progress towards reforming their laws
to secure downgrading to the second tier of the watch list. 2 Similarly, in
early 1990, the USTR removed Mexico following the Mexican government's commitment to seek stronger patent laws. Consequently, by the

88.

Id.

89.

See Hills Removes Taiwan, Korea, Saudi Arabia From Priority List, Five

Countries Remain, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at 1436 (Nov. 8, 1989).
90. These states were Brazil, India, Mexico, the People's Republic of China, and
Thailand. Id. at 1436.
91. Hills, Citing Significant Progress, Declines to Name Countries Under Special
301 Provision, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 616, 616 (May 2, 1990).
92. Id. The USTR removed the states from the priority watch list for a variety of
reasons. The USTR noted that Saudi Arabia had pledged to enact a copyright law compatible with the Berne Convention, was in the process of improving protection for computer software, and was clarifying the protection afforded to sound recordings. Id. In
contrast, Taiwan and Korea had won USTR approval of their initiatives to combat
piracy of intellectual property rights through increased enforcement of existing laws. Id.
93. Mexico's New PatentProtectionPlan Will Take It Off Special 301 Priority List,
7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 147, 147 (Jan. 31, 1990). The Mexican government
announced that it would seek legislation to expand the patent term under its laws to 20
years from the date of filing; offer patents to developers of alloys, chemical and pharmaceutical products, and biotechnology processes; restrict compulsory licenses; provide transitional patent protection; strengthen trade secret protection; and modify its trademark
rules. Id.
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end of the mechanism's first year, the threat of Special 301 actions had
produced concessions from four of the eight states originally targeted
under 'its provisions.94
The absence of actual investigations and retaliatory actions under Special 301, however, did not prevent the United States from penalizing
states that completely failed to enact or enforce adequate intellectual
property laws. More than a year after USTR Hills' first determination
on April 25, 1989, the United States formally designated three
states-China, India, and Thailand-as "priority foreign countries," 9
warranting a Special 301 investigation. On December 24, 1990, USTR
Hills announced the initiation of an ordinary section 301 investigation98
into-Thailand's enforcement of its domestic copyright legislation following receipt of a petition from several United States industry organizations. 97 Similarly, on March 15, 1991, the USTR's office initiated a section 301 investigation of Thailand's patent law to determine whether
retaliatory action was justified under the Trade Act of 1974.98 Thus,
although generally reluctant to invoke Special 301, the USTR continues
94. The four remaining states were Brazil, China, India, and Thailand. Of these,
China subsequently enacted a new copyright law providing increased protection for
sound recordings and computer software. Six PartiesComment on 17 Countries in Second Round Under Special 301 Provision, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 300,
300 (Feb. 28, 1990) [hereinafter Six Parties Comment]. This action, however, failed to
save China from designation six months later as a possible target for Special 301 action.
See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
These concessions-and the lack thereof from those states not named to the priority
watch list-were hardly sufficient to placate United States intellectual property owners
seeking actual employment of Special 301. See generally Six Parties Comment, supra;

Senators, Copyright Industries Criticize Thailand's Alleged Failure to Stop Piracy, 7
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 854 (June 13, 1990) (describing various comments
by United States intellectual property owners received by the USTR in connection with
the determination of which states should be subject to Special 301 action in 1990).
95. Although focusing on these states' lack of protection for pharmaceutical products,
the USTR also based her decision on their broad compulsory licensing provisions and a
lax enforcement of counterfeiting laws that had led to widespread piracy of all forms of
intellectual property. This decision, however, did not constitute an abandonment of the
watch-list structure; the same announcement added the European Community, Brazil,
and Australia to the priority watch list. USTR Designates China, India, and Thailand
Most Egregious Violators Under Special 301, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 643,
643 (May 1, 1991).
96. On the ordinary section 301 investigation, see infra notes 109-111 and accompanying text.

97.

See USTR Announces Section 301 Probe of Thailand's Copyright Protections,

41 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1012, at 212 (Jan. 3, 1991).
98. See Initiation of Section 302 Investigation, 56 Fed. Reg. 11,815 (Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative 1991).
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to employ more traditional trade-related measures to protect United
States intellectual property rights.
IV.

THE SPECIAL 301 MECHANISM: ESTABLISHING AN EVALUATIVE
FRAMEWORK

As enacted, the Special 301 action suggests an emerging consensus between United States industry and government concerning the relationship between international trade and intellectual property rights.9" First,
Special 301 represents an agreement that the protection of intellectual
property rights via trade mechanisms need to target United States competitiveness.1 00 Second, the Special 301 mechanism indicates that the
United States will insist that foreign states in which United States firms
operate, adopt, and enforce certain minimum standards of intellectual
property protection. 0 ' Third, Special 301 conditions receipt of trade and
other commercial concessions upon foreign states' adherence to these
standards. 0 2 Finally, negotiations under Special 301 have promoted the
ratification of these standards in international agreements, guaranteeing
enforceability under both domestic and international law. 0 3
Notwithstanding these features, however, the bilateral nature of Special 301 imposes limitations on its effectiveness by requiring negotiations
with other states. In any bilateral negotiation, the potential short-term
economic loss for a developing state whose intellectual property laws encourage piracy will generally equal the amount of revenue generated by
pirate companies within its borders.' 0 4 Because intellectual property pirates do not prey solely upon United States nationals in the developing
state, whether the United States gains from the elimination of the piracy
will outweigh the losses to the developing states depends on the particular price elasticity of the product in question.' 0 5 This guarantees that

99. See generally Gadbaw, supra note 16, at 226.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. For example, prior to the enactment of Special 301, Singapore's lenient laws
allowed pirates to control virtually all record and videotape sales made in the state, with
estimated losses to United States intellectual property owners at approximately $250 million annually. Faye Rice, How Copycats Steal Billions, FORTUNE, Apr. 22, 1991, at 157.
In contrast, by 1989, negotiations between the USTR and Singapore had resulted in a
reduction of counterfeit sales to less than 5% of sales in that state, with a concomitant
increase in legitimate sales to $465 million annually. Id.
104. Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 3, at 27 n.27.
105. Id. If price elasticities of demand for the product are sufficiently less than one,
United States intellectual property owners may be able to capture additional revenues
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negotiating strategies of both the United States and the foreign state will
be drawn very specifically to the particular facts and circumstances of
situation.
Special 301 also has the potential to distort international trade in a
manner that has effects far beyond the United States and the offending
foreign states in question.10 6 By imposing its own rules concerning the
appropriate level of protection for intellectual property rights, the United
States effectively forces its trading partners to adopt methods of protection that may or may not be the most desirable or efficient for those
states.10 7 Moreover, adherence to these standards may influence detrimentally the future rules and mechanisms for the international protection of intellectual property contained in agreements such as the
GATT 0 8

from price increases, thereby potentially gaining more revenue than the developing state
loses. Id.
106. Mody, supra note 75, at 225. For a description of this distorting effect in the
context of a United States Section 301 action in response to deficient Korean laws protecting intellectual property, see generally supra note 69.
107. Mody, supra note 75, at 225.
108. Id. Although an examination of existing multilateral agreements protecting intellectual property is beyond the scope of this Article, it should be noted that the United
States currently pursues both a bilateral and multilateral approach to the protection of
intellectual property in international markets. Administration Statement, supra note 1,
at 507. As part of its multilateral strategy, the United States has announced that it will:
(1) seek to conclude, in the [now failed Uruguay] GATT round of multilateral
trade negotiations, an enforceable multilateral trade agreement against trade-distorting practices arising from inadequate national protection of intellectual property. ...
(2) work to resolve persistent problems of counterfeiting by seeking the early
adoption of a GATT Anti-counterfeiting Code and to strengthen existing standards through the World Intellectual Property Organization.
(3) seek commitments by adherents to existing international intellectual property agreements to provide-through trade-based agreements where appropriate-adequate enforcement, transparency of governmental actions and regulations
anda commitment not to use intellectual property laws to distort international
trade.
(4) work for increased protection under the Paris convention and vigorously
pursue U.S. accession to the Berne Convention.
(5) improve protection for new and evolving technologies such as biotechnology
and semiconductor-chip designs.
(6) oppose erosion of protection under existing international treaties and
agreements.
(7) pursue greater adherence to agreements to reduce the burden and expense to
U.S. intellectual property owners of filing for protection in a large number of
countries.
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Therefore, the Special 301 mechanism should be used to cultivate a
carefully defined course of action heavily dependent on the special cir,cumstances of individual cases. Perhaps in recognition of this need, the
ordinary section 301 actions vest considerable political discretion in the
President and the USTR. The USTR can decline to initiate investigations for policy reasons, even if the act, policy, or practice in question
conflicts with section 301 as a matter of law. 0 9 Similarly, the President
can decline to act altogether, provided that the President records the reasons for the decision in the Federal Register."' Thus, section 301 actions
have a flexibility that differentiates them from other statutory trade remedies, such as antidumping and countervailing duty laws."'
Whether the Special 301 action retains this degree of flexibility is
doubtful. As previously indicated, section 2412(b)(2).. 2 provides that
within thirty days of a state's designation as a Special 301 priority state,
"the Trade Representative shall initiate an investigation" under section
301.13 Although the USTR is given two limited discretionary exemptions from initiating investigations under this section, the language governing these exemptions does not lend itself to consideration of the broad
policy factors necessary for the effective use of a bilateral trade weapon.
Furthermore, the USTR has not sought to interpret it as doing so." 4

(8) engage our trading partners in discussing the idea of establishing a multilateral or regional patent office ...

Id.
For comprehensive examinations of United States efforts at the failed Uruguay Round,
see generally R. Michael Gadbaw & Rosemary E. Gwynn, Intellectual Property Rights
in the New GATT Round, in Intellectual Property Rights: Global Consenus, Global
Conflict, supra note 3, at 38; Robert W. Kastenmeier & David Beier, International

Trade and Intellectual Property:Promise Risk, and Reality, 22

VAND.

J. TRANSNAT'L

L. 285 (1989); Hans Peter Kunz-Hallstein, The United States Proposalfor a GATT

Agreement on Intellectual Property and the Paris Conventionfor the Protection of Intellectual Property, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 265 (1989); United States Proposal to
GATT Concerning Intellectual Property Rights, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at
1371 (Nov. 4, 1987); Mark L. Damschroder, United States Goals in the Uruguay
Round, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 367 (1988).
For an examination of the effect of the United States employment of Special 301 on
negotiations at the Uruguay Round, see infra note 119 and accompanying text.
109. Bello & Holmer, supra note 75, at 647.
110. See id. at 652-53.
111. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1671-1677g (1988).
112. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(2). See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
113. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
114. Section 2412(b)(2)(B) provides that a self-initiated investigation of a Special
301 priority is not mandated if the USTR has determined that an investigation would be
detrimental to United States economic interests, provided that a detailed explanation of
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Consequently, investigations of Special 301 priority states appear to be
foregone conclusions.
Similarly, once an investigation has begun, the factors that led to a
state's having been designated as a Special 301 priority state make it
probable that its practices are actionable as a matter of law under the
retaliatory measures of section 301. As discussed previously, 1 5 the definitions of foreign practices targeted under the section 301 investigatory
mechanism correspond to a remarkable degree to the standards of Special
301 priority designation. If anything, the standards for priority status of
foreign actions. are stricter than those for retaliation. Consequently, considerations of political factors that might militate against a finding of an
actionable practice, such as United States relations with the foreign state
in question or broader policy considerations of the potential distortion of
international trade resulting from unilateral United States retaliation,
must wait until the sanction stage.
Once the process has reached the sanction stage, however, repairing
damage resulting from the investigation may no longer be possible.,"
The naming of foreign states to even the Special 301 priority watch list
has strained United States relations with the governments involved, even
though the United States has yet to undertake any retaliatory action.""'

the decision is forwarded to Congress. Id. § 2412(b)(2)(C). Although a strained reading
of this provision conceivably could be the basis of a USTR decision not to initiate an
investigation of a Special 301 priority state for political reasons (for example, on the
grounds that the potentially deleterious impact on United States bargaining power during GATT negotiations), this provision to date has not been invoked by the USTR in
decisions not to investigate.
Similarly, section 2412(c) exempts the USTR from initiating an investigation if it
appears that the investigation would be ineffective in addressing the foreign policy in
question. Id. § 2412(c). Although the latter provision arguably provides flexibility to the
USTR options, the United States government has used successfully the highly discretionary section 301 to bring about effective progress in increasing Korea's protection of intellectual property. See generally supra note 75. This use may obviate an argument that an
investigation of a Special 301 priority state would not be effective in addressing foreign
unfair practices. Consequently, this language fails to provide a discretionary exemption
from investigations when, although retaliatory action would be effective per se, political
or other considerations militate against its employment.
115. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
116. Even at the sanction stage, when the USTR has considerable latitude in determining a response, see supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text, Special 301's enabling
legislation, as in the context of investigation initiations, has restricted the USTR's discretion from that enjoyed before 1988. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(5)(A) (constraining
USTR to give preference to the imposition of duties over other types of import
restrictions).
117. See, e.g., India, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 104, 104 (Jan. 17, 1990)
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As a result, actual investigations of Special 301 priority states are likely
to have significant political repercussions that merit consideration prior
to any decision to initiate an investigation." 8
Moreover, the mere enactment of Special 301 proved to be a major
irritant at Uruguay Round negotiations seeking to incorporate intellectual property standards into the GATT."9 Accordingly, frequent resort
to Special 301 as a legal basis for trade retaliation may produce a backlash affecting the United States bargaining position. When combined
with the potential of multilateral initiatives such as the GATT, which
may provide greater protection for intellectual property rights, this result
illustrates the need for a discretionary escape clause that permits the
USTR to decline to initiate investigations of priority states if necessary
(Gandhi government characterizing India's placement on priority watch list as "unjustified, irrational, and unfair"); Hills Removes Taiwan, Korea, Saudi Arabia From Priority List, supra note 89, at 1437 (quoting economic advisor at the Mexican embassy as
noting his government's view that Special 301 process is not a "positive attitude"); cf
Heinz Sees Difficulty in Changing U.S. Law Found to be Incompatible with GATT
Rules, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1467, 1468 (Nov. 15, 1989) [hereinafter
Heinz Sees Difficulty] (Assistant USTR acknowledgment that EC has "fundamental
problems" with Special 301).
118. Indeed, China, after being named to the priority foreign state list, labelled the
action "unacceptable" and predicted that it "will have an extremely negative effect on
normal economic and trade cooperation." China Calls Designation Under Special 301
"Unacceptable," Warns Trade Endangered, Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. Daily
(BNA), May 2, 1991, available in LEXIS, BNA Library. Similarly, the chairman of the
Indo-U.S. Business Council described India's designation as "[a] retrograde step which
will foul U.S.-India trade relations." India Minister Hopeful U.S. Talks Will Lead to
Removal From Special 301 List, Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. Daily, May 2, 1991,
available in LEXIS, BNA Library.
119. See, e.g., Japanese Officials Welcome Super 301 News, While Brazil, EC See
GATT Round Benefits, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 615, 617 (May 2, 1990)
(quoting EC source as observing that United States decision on April 27, 1990 not to
target other states for Special 301 investigations as "much-needed sign of the U.S. intent
to seek multilaterally negotiated solutions to trade problems, rather than to pursue bilateral efforts backed by the threat of multilateral sanctions"); Uruguay Round, 7 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 84, 86 (Jan. 17, 1990) (noting that the GATT secretariat
has identified "a question of consistency" between the United States interest in improving
GATT's rules and its bilateral actions through measures such as Special 301 and has
characterized this as "a major concern" on the part of United States trading partners);
U.S. Special 301 Process Undermining GATT, Hurts U.S. Credibility, Brazil Official
Says, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 845, 846 (June 28, 1989) (noting Brazilian
government's belief that use of Special 301 conflicts with the GATT and undermines the
credibility of United States commitment to multilateral negotiations regarding intellectual
property); Heinz Sees Difficulty, supra note 117, at 1468 (Assistant USTR acknowledgment that Special 301 "aggravated" intellectual property discussions at failed Uruguay
Round).
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to protect United States bargaining power. These features of Special
301's governing statutory framework provide an important insight into
USTR Hills' decision to create the two-tiered "watch list" system and to
continue to employ the more flexible ordinary section 301 action, reserving actual use of the Special 301 mechanism for only those states with
egregiously deficient protection of intellectual property rights. Given the
possibility of serious political consequences resulting from the Special
301's likelihood of an investigation and finding of an actionable practice
when a priority state is at issue, the practical point of decision under
Special 301 comes at the point of a state's being designated as a priority
state. Thus, if a serious examination of the merits of trade-based retaliation under Special 301 against those states failing to provide adequate
protection for intellectual property is to be undertaken at all, it must be
necessarily at that stage.
Seen in this light, the USTR's reluctance actually to employ the Special 301 mechanism is understandable. Use of the two-tiered watch list
system prior to the actual invocation of Special 301 may be viewed as an
attempt to inject an added degree of flexibility into a process now hindered by an absence of substantive discretion. The practical effect of the
USTR's placement of a state on the priority watch list is to designate it
a priority state for the purposes of Special 301, and then to stay the
initiation of an investigation. Through this process, the USTR can create
a credible threat of future retaliation without risking the potential negative effects of a potentially automatic investigation and finding of an actionable practice. Should this approach prove unsuccessful, the United
States, under USTR Hills' interpretation of the measure, has the additional leverage of an actual investigation. Thus, the USTR's invocation
of the two-tiered system represents a logical and necessary response to an
inartfully drafted governing statute.
Whatever the merits of the watch list approach from a policy standpoint, however, the USTR's present strategy has no clear legal basis in
the Special 301 statutory framework. Although section 2242(b) gives the
USTR the authority to determine which states' practices are sufficiently
"onerous and egregious" to qualify for priority status, no indication exists that Congress intended this language to provide the basis for a broad
administrative interpretation effectively allowing the bypass of the
mandatory investigation mechanism. Similarly, section 301's governing
statutes fail to provide for the issuance of a formal warning to potential
targets prior to an actual investigation.
The success of the USTR's watch list strategy in securing increased
protection of United States intellectual property rights prior to actual use
of the Special 301 mechanism suggests that Congress should amend the
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action in one of two ways. First, Congress could ratify the two-tier
watch list strategy, either by incorporating it expressly into section
2242(b) or by permitting the USTR to draw distinctions between states
possessing differing degrees of deficient intellectual property laws. Second, Congress could increase the discretion granted to the USTR in section 2412(c) by permitting the USTR to decline to initiate investigations
of priority states.
Congressional adoption of either of these alternatives would have two
desirable effects. First, it would provide statutory authorization for the
strategy actually adopted by the USTR in implementing Special 301,
thus eliminating the incongruity of United States trade policy being conducted in a manner on its face inconsistent with existing law.1 " Second,
with this authority Congress would restore a degree of USTR discretion
present in the original section 301 action that distinguishes it from other,
less effective remedies. The result would be a trade-based measure capable of protecting United States intellectual property rights abroad, yet
sufficiently flexible to permit molding to individual situations.
V.

CONCLUSION

Six months after the announcement of the first watch list under Special 301, USTR Hills praised the measure for providing a flexibility that
starkly contrasted with the "blunt instrument" approach of other trade
remedies.121 The success of the combined Special 301 and section 301
approach in securing concessions from foreign states with insufficient
protection of intellectual property rights undeniably has validated the
USTR's optimism about the measure's potential. As a result, Special 301
likely will play an increasingly important role in United States trade
policy in the future.
This Article has demonstrated, however, that the statutory text governing Special 301 is characterized more properly as a relatively inflexible remedy that allows the USTR to exercise little discretion in initiating
investigations. Once the USTR identifies a priority state under Special

120. This result, although salutary in a general sense, applies particularly in the
context of the Special 301 action, given express congressional concern with preserving the
credibility of the measure. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2)(B)(iv) (directing the USTR to
take into account the potential loss of credibility of not taking action against foreign
practices found to be actionable violations when the taking of action would have an adverse impact on the United States economy substantially out of proportion with the benefits of such action).
121. USTR Hills Criticizes Community's Response to U.S. Agriculture Proposal
Before GATT, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 1421, 1422 (Nov. 1, 1989).
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301, the initiation of an investigation and a finding of actionable conduct
on the part of the foreign state are in effect foregone conclusions with
potentially negative consequences. To the extent that the Special 301 action possesses any significant degree of flexibility, this feature results
from the USTR's administrative interpretation, rather than from the
structure of Special 301 itself. This inflexibility has caused the USTR to
adopt the watch-list system and to continue to rely upon the ordinary
section 301 investigation as a mechanism for deterring truly inadequate
foreign protection of United States intellectual property rights, while relying on the Special 301 action only as a last resort.
Given a choice between amending the governing statutory language to
conform with the USTR's policy or exerting pressure to bring USTR
action into strict compliance with the letter of the law, Congress should
choose the former alternative. By doing so, Congress would reaffirm the
United States commitment to use only bilateral remedies malleable
enough to adapt to the particular facts and circumstances of individual
cases. The ultimate result would be a remedy better capable of serving as
an effective weapon for the protection of United States intellectual property rights worldwide.

